Recalibration Ahead: The Global South and the Emergence of a Thin Liberal International Order
On how the Global South will (re)position itself — and why this may lead to a thin Liberal International Order.
In the coming years, the Global South (GS) may need to reassess the distanced or cautiously sympathetic stance it developed during the early phases of the war in Ukraine. This posture was not merely about the war itself, but rather about longstanding frustrations: resentment over Western dominance of the international system, dissatisfaction with their marginal role in global governance, and the search for opportunities to push toward a more equitable world order. Even countries that disapproved of Russia’s invasion or rejected Moscow’s narratives were reluctant to fully align with the West, especially under U.S. leadership. They were unwilling to sacrifice their own interests or narrow their geopolitical options.
This balancing act was neatly captured by Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s pointed remark: “Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” It signaled a deep-seated desire in the GS to decenter European priorities and assert their own. Yet, as David Miliband argued in his Foreign Affairs essay “The World Beyond Ukraine,” the West missed a critical chance to broaden its coalition by addressing the legitimate concerns of the Global South. Instead of approaching the Ukraine crisis as an inclusive geopolitical challenge, the West framed it through a narrow “autocracies vs. democracies” lens — a framing that was bound to alienate many in the GS from the outset.
The war in Ukraine offered the West a moment to reset, to embrace the broader concerns of the Global South, and to undertake serious reforms in global governance structures — ensuring greater voice, influence, and legitimacy for GS states. Such engagement could have helped secure broader support in confronting Russia and China’s challenges to the liberal international order (LIO). Yet this moment was squandered. A second opportunity arose with the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, which has escalated beyond what many in the Global South consider acceptable. Again, Western elites largely failed to grasp how profoundly the global landscape has shifted, clinging instead to traditional geopolitical playbooks — ironically confirming much of the Global South’s critique about Western rigidity and selectivity.
Despite all this, there remains some expectation that elements of the liberal international order will persist, albeit perhaps in a weakened or more cosmetic form. Three main arguments sustain this outlook. First, some analysts argue that the international institutions underpinning the LIO possess enough institutional resilience to survive even as U.S. hegemony declines. This belief predates the Ukraine war and leans on institutional inertia and embedded norms. Second, a more recent argument suggests that the very forces now challenging the LIO — rising powers, revisionist states, and dissatisfied actors — are themselves beneficiaries of the system. In this sense, the LIO has succeeded too well: by enabling the rise of challengers, it has proven its vitality, and even these challengers recognize its utility. As a result, they do not seek to entirely dismantle the system but to selectively reform it. Third, some argue that the LIO was never truly global. What we are witnessing, then, is less the collapse of the LIO itself and more the decline of U.S. dominance. According to this view, the LIO remains largely intact in the spaces where it was always meant to function, primarily within the Western sphere, and will likely persist there for some time.
These perspectives help explain why the Global South may soon need to recalibrate its approach. The GS’s claims for greater influence and recognition are not aimed at tearing down the existing institutional architecture; rather, they are about securing more equitable representation within it. Their demands rest on LIO norms — appeals to fairness, legitimacy, and rules-based governance — rather than on brute power or territorial conquest. Yet these claims are not naive: the GS expects to gain space and voice when global power is more balanced, not when one hegemon is simply replaced by another. Importantly, what the GS seems to desire is not a thick, Kantian liberal order with expansive and progressive global ambitions, but a thinner, more minimal LIO — one with limited shared core norms that still allows diverse nations to pursue their own visions of the good life within a stable international framework. This preference arises not only from ideological differences but also from capacity constraints. Few non-Western states have the internal resources or global power to actively support or enforce a thick, expansive LIO.
However, the aftermath of the Ukraine war and the broader global shifts it has set in motion are producing three key dynamics that will likely force the GS to rethink its position. First, the conflict has reaffirmed the primacy of hard power in international politics — a reality not all GS countries are equipped or willing to embrace. Second, the war has catalyzed forms of multilateralism that operate outside the Western-led system. But Western discourse often dismisses such platforms, clinging to a Cold War–era mindset that equates “proper” multilateralism with Western involvement or leadership. As non-Western multilateral initiatives reach their limits or hit a saturation point, many in the GS may eventually seek validation or engagement from the West, rather than pushing for fully insulated or decoupled institutions. So there will likely be another chance for the West to influence the shaping of the new world order. In this moment, to secure meaningful and lasting support, the West cannot rely solely on playing the familiar game of traditional geopolitics or great power rivalry. It must find ways to uphold and advance the liberal international order beyond the framework of Western or specifically U.S. hegemony. This means reimagining the LIO not as a tool of Western dominance but as a genuinely shared global framework that reflects the aspirations, concerns, and contributions of a much wider array of actors. Only by demonstrating that the LIO can survive and thrive without being synonymous with U.S. primacy can the West offer the Global South a compelling reason to invest in, rather than hedge against, the existing system. This requires shifting from demanding loyalty or alignment to offering partnership and co-ownership — a transition from conditional support to shared stewardship.
If these trends hold, we are likely heading toward a reconfigured, thinner liberal international order — one in which the Global South plays a larger, more confident role, but within a system still structured by foundational LIO principles. Whether the West will seize this moment to reform and adapt or continue missing opportunities remains an open question.